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Abstract 
This paper examines the relationship between social capital and performance of fiscal institutions 
using provincial sub-national state level data in India during 1991-2012. Institution in India is 
significant and controls fiscal performances as per social need for economic development. People 
participation in public affairs or simply vote turnover in general election in India is taken to measure 
the social trust on fiscal institution. Fiscal performance in India is based on social capital. As one 
percent vote turnover rate rises fiscal deficit reduces by 2.6 to 2.8 percent. Empirical findings suggest 
that social capital indirectly control the fiscal performance of the elected government. The results are 
robust to a number of control variables. The strong political trust is established through high turnover 
rate and vote share in the election for formation of government that create the platform for sound 
fiscal policy decisions.  
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1. Introduction 
Provincial sub-national state governments in India have accumulated large fiscal deficits or 
government debts during 1991-2012. Why do provincial sub-national states in India raise 
large debts during 1991-2012? This paper focuses on possible explanation to this question 
analysing the role of social capital and performance of political or fiscal institutions in India. 
These institutions are particularly important for making fiscal policy decisions. Fiscal 
institutions create the environment, the incentives, the rules and the regulations under which 
budgets are drafted, approved, and implemented. Fiscal institutions promote fiscal discipline 
through proper design of fiscal policy1. Sometimes social and institutional framework may 
produce soft budget constraints that provide incentives for loose fiscal discipline. These rules 
highly vary over provincial sub-national state governments and thus provide a reasonable 
explanation for cross-section variations in debt levels or fiscal deficit performance levels2 
(Alesina and Perotti 1995; Poterba and von Hagen 1999; Persson and Tabellini 2001). 
In this context we should mentioned major difference between quantitative and procedural 
institutions (Buchanan 1980). Quantitative rules entail tax and expenditures limitation laws, 
debt brakes and other formal restraints to balance the budget. Empirical observation of Bohn 
and Inman (1996), Poterba (1997) and Shadbegian (1998) suggest that the budget rules 
support the fiscal discipline for policy makers. Procedural institutions define how property 
rights over political decisions are acquired, and assign authority to exercise them. Persson 
and Tabellini (2003) observed that the constitutional design of the regime type and the 
electoral rules crucially and significantly shape the fiscal policy decisions. However, it is 
impossible to design a constitution to establish a framework of quantitative and procedural 
institutions that answers all future questions of a society. So, there is certain degree of 
uncertainty. Hence, trust becomes a crucial aspect. Without uncertainty, trust is insignificant 
                                                          
1Voters (citizens) elect politicians to make decisions about public spending and also provide the funds by paying 
taxes. There are two aspects (i) the principal–agent relationship between voters (the principals) and politicians 
(the agents), and (ii) the common pool problem of public finances - these are important for the conduct of fiscal 
policy. Elected politicians can extract rents from being in office. They use some of the funds entrusted to them 
to pursue their own interests, be it outright in corruption, for perks, etc. Voters might wish to eliminate the 
opportunity to extract rents by subjecting politicians to rules stipulating what they can and must do under given 
conditions or contracts. But the need is to react to unforeseen developments and the complexity of the situation 
makes the writing of such contracts impossible. Similarly, politicians cannot realistically commit fully to 
promises made during election campaigns. Hence, like principal-agent relations in many other settings, the 
voter-politician relationship resembles an “incomplete contract” (Seabright (1996), Persson et al. (1997a, b), 
Tabellini (2000), von Hagen (2002)). 
2 There is growing interest in how political and institutional factors affect fiscal performance at national level 
(Roubini and Sachs 1989, Hagen 1992, Alesina and Perotti 1996, 1997; Poterba 1996, Strauch and von Hagen 
2000, Perotti and Kontopoulos 2002) and local levels (Dafflon 2002, Hagen and Vabo 2005). 
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issue because certainty ensures same outcomes with or without a trusting act involved 
(Guerra and Zizzo 2003). Mutual trust in the case of uncertainty reduces transaction costs and 
makes the institution to work smoothly (Putnam et al. 1993, Putnam 2000; Fukuyama 1995). 
Trust is one of the most important and highly significant components of a social capital3, 
which is embed with the institution. Here, social trust plays the most important role in fiscal 
policy decisions. So, it is reasonable to assume that social trust/capital fosters fiscal discipline 
in all society. 
The paper concentrates initially on the relationship between social capital and fiscal deficit 
and later analyses in details using the sample of major Indian provincial states over the period 
1991 - 2012. Here, trust is measured in two ways (i) as the percentage vote turnover during 
general election in India, i.e., trust on delegates or representatives for the political institution 
and measuring the level of citizens’ chance to express their preferences, (ii) as the 
performance of the delegates in the policy making body (i.e., the parliament), i.e., work 
efforts in the policy making institute and measuring it in terms of working days or business 
hours in the decision making process. Percentage vote turnover definitely helps to increase 
governmental responsibility and accountability. It is true that the government is forced to be 
responsive to citizens’ preferences and underlying social contract rule, which leads to a 
higher level of fiscal discipline. So, our basic hypothesis is that higher level of social trust on 
delegates leads to a stronger fiscal discipline. 
Institutional and Cultural frameworks typical for specific countries might influence trust. The 
problem is that such features cannot always be controlled in a satisfactory manner. This paper 
focuses on within country data at the state level. Here, trust variable that measures the choice 
behaviour expressed at the election that reduces possible subjective biases derived from 
survey questionnaires. Several studies work with cross-sectional data. In this paper panel data 
analysis allows exploiting time variation in trust. 
The remainder of the paper is as follows: Section 2 provides a quick overview of the 
literature. Section 3 describes data and methodology adopted in this study. Section 4 
discusses the results and follows the empirical implementation of the impact of trust on fiscal 
performance. Section 5 offers some concluding remarks. 
                                                          
3 Concept of social capital is multidimensional and it emerges from different aspects of social life. The work of 
Putnam (1993) and Fukuyama (1995) have renewed interest on it in the social basis of political and economic 
development. Putnam (1993) shows the importance of social capital for the effective governance in a democratic 
social system. According to Putnam (1993) social capital is the features of social organization, such as trust, 
norms, and networks that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions.  
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2. Literature Review 
The concept of social capital evolves over time4 and it has been defined in several ways. 
Social capital is the network of objective relationships (structural dimension) that people and 
organizations have, and subjective relationships (cognitive dimension) that linked to norms 
and trust in other people and organizations. Initially the social organization is considered as 
social capital, ‘facilitating the achievement of goals that could not be achieved in its absence 
or could be achieved only at a higher cost’ (Coleman (1990)). Putnam et al (1993) provide 
similar characterization referring to ‘the features of social organization, such as trust, norms, 
and networks that can improve the efficiency of society’. Whereas Fukuyama (1995) argues 
for certain shared norms and values that assure ‘the meeting of obligation and reciprocity’. 
Putnam (2000) introduces the idea of social capital in terms of ‘connections among 
individuals – social networks and the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise from 
them.’ At individual level social capital also refers to a system of interpersonal networks 
(Dasgupta 2002), which enhances cooperation and collaboration that helps also to create the 
economic opportunities. Social capital might be considered as ‘resources embedded in social 
networks and accessed and used by actors for actions’ (Lin 2001). Social capital can be 
considered as the stock of active connections among individuals and also helps to resolve 
collective problems easily in the form of ‘cooperative action’ (Cohen and Prusak 2001). 
The growing literature claims that repeating trustful interactions in the economy do sediment 
in higher levels of generalized trust, which is aggregated stock of trust. Scholars like Miguel 
(2003), Mogues and Carter (2005), Rupasingha et al. (2006) study the relationship between 
the stock of social capital and its relation to economic development, especially, low crime 
rates and reduction of other social problems. Countries/regions with relatively higher stocks 
of social capital, in terms of generalized trust and widespread civic engagement seem to 
achieve higher levels of growth, compared to societies with low trust (Putnam et al. 1993). 
Social capital contributes to economic growth by focusing the importance of trust and 
cooperation within firm, industry, market and the state. Thus, social capital truly greases the 
wheels that allow nations to advance smoothly and creates the base for economic prosperity. 
Economic development of a nation depends on the impact of social capital which includes 
social culture, social norms and regulations that promote economic reforms and development 
                                                          
4 Truly the concept of social capital has a long history in the social sciences. The concept of social capital has 
been developed primarily in the subjects of sociology and political science. It has become popular in several 
fields of policymaking and research. Bourdieu (1980, 1986), Coleman (1988, 1990) and Putnam (1993, 1995, 
2000) are credited for introducing the concept of social capital and popularized it.  
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activities. Social capital in the sense of trust among members of a civil society and social 
cohesion fosters institutional activities. Interactions among citizens build up social trust. 
Interaction between trust (thought of as an individual behaviour) and public policy seems to 
be important to increase the effectiveness of fiscal performance5. In this study we propose 
one of the fundamental reasons focusing on the country specific quality of informal 
institutions. Social capital refers to the notion of informal institutions which is a proxy of the 
level of generalized trust6.  
Initially, Almond and Verba (1963) investigated the concept of trust intensively. Recently the 
work of Putnam (1993) and Fukuyama (1995) have renewed interest on it in the social basis 
of political and economic development. Putnam (1993) shows the importance of social 
capital for the effective governance in a democratic social system. According to Putnam 
(1993) social capital is the features of social organization, which can improve the efficiency 
of society by facilitating coordinated actions.  
Bourdieu (1979) and Coleman (1988, 1990) have strongly influenced the social capital 
literature focusing on individuals and small societal units. Portes and Mooney (2002) point 
out that social capital is the ability to secure resources by virtue of membership in social 
networks or larger social structures. Knack and Keefer (1997) investigated the impact of civic 
duty and trust on growth and investment rates in a cross section analysis. Knack and Keefer 
(1997) find a strong and significant positive relationship between social capital variables and 
economic growth. Looking at the public finance literature, Slemrod (1998) argues that the 
                                                          
5 Information asymmetry hampers the proper functioning of markets, and its result is the market failure. 
‘Benevolent Government’ maximise social welfare and it can prevent market failure by providing public goods, 
for instance. Since information is asymmetry between government and citizens, it is difficult for citizens to 
evaluate the government’s activities. This leads politicians and bureaucrats to behave in a way that maximises 
self-interest. The government is forced to be efficient to maximise social welfare, resulting in economic growth, 
if citizens can obtain sufficient information about the government’s activities. 
6 Trust results from interactions that span co-worker, team, organizational and inter-organizational alliances. 
Trust is closely tied to the norms, values and beliefs of the organizational culture. Trust is the outcome of 
communications behaviours, such as providing accurate information, explanations for decisions and 
demonstrating sincere and appropriate openness. Trust is constantly changing as it cycles through phases of 
building, destabilization and dissolving. Trust consists of multiple factors at cognitive, emotional and 
behavioural levels, all of which affect individual’s perceptions of trust. The degree to which person agree on 
who has rightful power to influence others. For the most stable, positive relationship, organizations and publics 
must have some degree of control over each other. So, trust can only be considered in the broader context of the 
relationships an organization has with its various publics. Citizens expect public organizations to do things for 
the society for which organizations get little or nothing in return, that is how they develop trust. 
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social capital derived from the willingness to pay taxes voluntarily lowers the cost of the 
operating government and of equitably assigning its cost to citizens7.  
The World Bank is also focusing on social capital and investigating the practical relevance of 
this concept8. There are several views on social capital (Grootaert 2001): First, the concept 
developed by Putnam et al. (1993) interpreting social capital as a social network, as networks 
of civic engagement facilitating coordination and cooperation. Second, Coleman’s (1988, p. 
598) approach defines social capital as “a variety of different entities”, consisting of some 
aspects of social structure and facilitating certain actions of actors. This allows taking into 
account not only horizontal but also vertical social relationships. Third concept considers the 
social and political environment that enforces norms and shapes social structures.  
Our investigation in this paper grounds basically on the third concept, which takes the more 
formalized institutional relationship between state and citizens at the vertical level into 
account. As trust is a multidimensional concept, we restrict our focus on a specific 
dimension: citizens’ political trust. This is in line with Rothstein (2003), who argues that the 
explanation of social capital is much more grounded in political instead of sociological 
variables. 
The efficient, effective and equitable operation of society not only requires the investment of 
money and resources, but also cooperation between individuals and institutions that constitute 
a society’s social capital (Dasgupta and Serageldin 1999, Putnam 2000, Fahey, Nolan and 
Whelan 2003). Trust reflects, individual beliefs about behaviour of other people, also whether 
public policy institutions can be relied on to act fairly (Anderson et al 2009). Effective 
service delivery of public institutions is based on the assessing the trustworthiness of 
individuals, political parties or government. A high level of trust creates confidence in public 
services and it may also stimulate economic development. On the other hand, the absence of 
trust reduces the radius of cooperation with family and friends and make more difficult for 
government to rely on the support of citizens (Fukuyama 1995). Putnam’s (1993) theory of 
social capital links trust in people and in political institutions. Putnam postulates that positive 
informal relations at home, at workplace and in local communities encourage people to create 
                                                          
7 Aidt and Mooney (2014) support it with argument that taxpayer suffrage, where the right to vote and the 
obligation to pay local taxes are linked, encourages demands for retrenchment and the political budget cycle 
manifests itself in election year tax cuts and savings on administration costs. 
8 The rapid growth of the social capital literature underlines a widespread unease with the standard explanations 
for the differential political and economic performances not only across nations but also across sub-national 
jurisdictions (Ostrom and Ahn 2003). Many studies in the last ten years tried to check to which extent social 
capital can be seen as an important omitted factor in previous studies. 
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formal organisations that can spill up, leading to the formation of civil society institutions 
that represent the views of individuals to national government. So, the government engages in 
dialogue with civil society institutions in order to extend the radius of trust and cooperation 
from the lowest to the highest levels of the multilevel system that constitutes governance in 
India. Trust in political institutions is important to public officials and Member of Parliament 
(MPs) as a mark of popular respect. An extensive body of social science literature exists 
about the causes and correlates of political trust.  
There are three ways in which trust affects government performance according to Knack 
(1999). First, trust broadens government accountability. Policy decisions have to be 
responsive to the preferences of a large part of the population. Knack (1999), for example, 
provides empirical evidence, that US states with a higher social capital significantly perform 
better than the other states. Second, trust can facilitate an agreement, where political 
preferences are polarized. Third, social cohesion in a society is a breeding ground for 
innovations in politics. In general, the space for innovations is greater if trust between 
members of a society is established. If new challenges have to be tackled, governments with 
high social capital are more flexible in adapting to the new circumstances than regions with 
widespread interests. Little political polarization in regions with a strong social cohesion 
makes it easier for the government to implement policies preferred by the electorate. 
Moreover, little social fragmentation in the society reduces the asymmetry between spending 
claims of different interest groups and taxing decisions. Therefore, a more homogenous 
citizenry supports fiscal discipline. 
Government accountability can be seen as the most important aspect of trust with respect to 
fiscal performance. Engagement, involvement and participation in political and public issues 
by a large part of the electorate are an important feature to hold politicians and bureaucrats 
accountable. If decision makers expect citizens to hold them politically accountable, they are 
more inclined to temper their worst impulses rather than face public protests. Political 
participation in general election allows citizens to discuss on developmental agenda and also 
definitely helps to improve political awareness. So, the government knows that citizens are 
discussing and monitoring their behaviour, which will produce the incentive to govern more 
effectively9. 
                                                          
9 Democratic citizens would like to have trustworthy institutions, and governors want to be trusted, because this 
can strengthen their capacity for governance, since citizens who trust are more likely to give their governors the 
benefit of the doubt when unpopular decisions are taken. But trust cannot be taken for granted. 
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There is certain amount of scepticism or distrust in political institutions by citizens. Since 
distrust is often thought to make people abstain from politics, scholars look at turnout at 
general elections. Trust is depressed when citizens believe that politicians do not care about 
people like themselves and are dissatisfied about how the national economy is managed. 
Characteristics of a country’s political institutions tend to depress turnout (Rose 2004). The 
institutional theories (the Michigan model) stress stimuli from political mobilization and 
government performance. A matrix model of turnout10 helps to account for variations in 
turnout as a function of the intersection between individual attributes and perceptions. 
Institutional stimuli come from both national and sub-national or sub-regional levels and 
influence individuals with varying socio-economic attributes in different states or sub-
national level. It actually emphasizes the importance of cross-level perceptions involving 
social psychological engagement with national politics and stimuli from state or national 
institutions. Popular trust for civil and political institutions is vital to democracy11. Citizens 
evaluate institutions based partly on their evaluations of current institutions in comparison to 
past, partly on their degree of social/community sentiment and partly on their assessments of 
current and future economic performance. As the government is better aware of citizens’ 
preferences, policies will better reflect citizens’ needs (Boix and Posner 1998). Trust in 
politics measures the level of confidence citizens have in their political leaders or 
institutions12. This paper focuses on fiscal performances (deficit or public debt) as dependent 
variable. It is reasonable to argue that a prudent debt management and thus a certain level of 
fiscal discipline can be seen as a proxy for governmental performance. Vote turnovers help to 
increase governmental accountability, so that the government is forced to be responsive to 
citizens’ preferences and the underlying social contract rule of law at large, favoring a higher 
level of fiscal discipline. Trust in particular government formation is a signal for a stronger 
social cohesion between the government and the electorate, which in turn results in sound 
fiscal policy decisions. So, our objective is to examine the following hypothesis: Fiscal 
Performance inversely related to the trust in government.  
There are several views on social capital (Grootaert 2001) at macroeconomic level: First, the 
concept developed by Putnam (1993) interpreting social capital as a social network, as 
                                                          
10 See Matrix Model of Turnout (Rose and Borz (2011)).  
11 See Mishler and Rose (1995) for ‘Trust, Distrust and Skepticism about Institutions of Civil Society’. 
12 If the institutional structures influence the citizens and the authorities interact in a sense of collective 
responsibility then the system may be governed in better way and its policies may be more effective. Trust 
promotes effectiveness through its impact on governments’ behavior. 
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networks of civic engagement facilitating coordination and cooperation. Second, Coleman’s 
(1988) approach defines social capital as “a variety of different entities”, consisting of some 
aspects of social structure and facilitating certain actions of actors. This allows taking into 
account not only horizontal but also vertical social relationships. Third concept considers the 
social and political environment that enforces norms and shapes social structures. Our 
investigation in this paper grounds basically on the third concept, which takes the more 
formalized institutional relationship between state and citizens at the vertical level into 
account.  
3. Data and Methodology 
State wise general election data are taken from the Election commission of India for the 
period of 1991 -2012. Vote turnover is measured as a percentage of votes casted in the 
general elections. Fiscal data are mainly revenue and expenditure of state governments in 
India. State fiscal data are available from annual state budgets in every year. Fiscal 
performance of states related data are collected mainly from Reserve Bank of India (RBI). 
Other variables are collected from relevant departments13 of the government of India. All are 
time series data for each state. We compile all and obtain a panel data. So, we apply panel 
data analysis technique which is appropriate for this study.  
In order to test whether social capital fosters fiscal discipline, we propose the following 
equation: 
FDit = α +β SCit +λ T + ηi +𝜇Zit +εit                 (1) 
Where FD fiscal deficit of ith state in t year, SC denotes social capital, T is time trend, η is 
state effect, Z is other control variables14, and ε is the disturbance term. The two sorts of 
regressions differ in the scaling of their left-hand variable.  
4. Results  
Table 1 describes the summary statistics of our focus variables in panel data set for the study 
period of 1991-2012. Fiscal deficit is the difference between expenditure and revenue 
measured rupees (Crore) in constant price at base year 2004-2005. Average value of fiscal 
deficit for the entire period is Rs. 43552 but standard deviation is very high. Percentage of 
                                                          
13 Data related to election, fiscal institution, literacy, crime statistics and population are taken from the Election 
Commission of India, the Ministry of Parliamentary Affair, Ministry of Human Resource, Ministry of Home and 
Census of India, respectively. 
14 The regression contains also several control variables like GDP per capita, literacy rate, share of urban 
population, share of workforce, share of population with higher schooling, share of unemployed, share of 
pensioners, share of pupils, population density in a state. In order to control for time as well as state invariant 
factors we include fixed time T and fixed state ηi effects. 
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vote turnovers in the general election is an important variable in this study and indicates trust 
on political institution. Vote turnover rate varies widely (Table 1), because of several reasons 
for different states (Feld and Matsusaka 2003 or Feld, Schaltegger and Schnellenbach, 2004). 
Average vote turnover rates are 61.28 percent and 69.81 percent in Lok Sabha and Bidhan 
Sabha, respectively. So, more than 60 percent voters trust on political institutions (Assembly 
and Parliament). 
Here Insert Table 1 
 
On an average vote percentage gap between the winner and runner is about 10 percent, but 
seat margin is around 46.  It should be noted that rejected vote is nearly 2 percent and its 
maximum value is 9.2 percent, which is very high. It can be interpreted that 2 percent people 
are not interested to reveal their choice preferences. Rejected vote may be a signal of distrust 
on political institution and/or its representatives. Average family size, average economic 
crime rate and literacy rate are 5.02, 6.91 and 72.29, respectively. Fig 1 displays the 
distribution of log of fiscal deficits [i.e., log(FD)]. Fig 2 shows the distribution of trust 
variable which follows approximately a normal distribution.  
 
Insert Fig 1& 2 
 
Using Indian state panel data we estimate equation (1) for level variables and also for 
transformation variables (i.e., log transformation or log value of original variable). Applying 
panel data techniques the estimated result of log of fiscal deficit is presented in Table 2.  
Strong variation among states as well as over time allows exploiting within-state variation to 
identify effects of trust on performance of government. Trust has a statistically significant 
negative impact on fiscal discipline in all regressions, controlling for other determinants. 
Table 2 provides the estimated results of trust on log of fiscal deficit. The estimated 
coefficient of trust is negative and statistically significant. Fiscal deficit reduces by 2.6% to 
2.8 % if one percent vote turnover rate rises. Coefficient of time is positive and statistically 
significant. It suggests that fiscal deficit increases over time. In this simple model, constant 
term is highly significant15.  
                                                          
15 Constant term may turn to be insignificant incorporating other variables. On the other hand, the share of urban 
population pushes up debt levels. This points out to a higher governmental willingness to increase public debts 
in urban areas, which may be caused by specific problems of cities like social heterogeneity. The provision and 
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Here Insert Table 2 
 
The results indicate that we find a fairly robust negative relationship between social trust and 
fiscal deficit. So, fiscal policy is strongly influenced by social trust measured in terms of vote 
turnover to support political agenda16 and form the government in the country.  
We use information from voter participation on general election for forming government to 
perform fiscal activities. Selecting few other fiscal indicators this paper also examines the 
various social determining factors. Table 3 presents the estimated results of selected few 
fiscal indicators as percentage of gross state domestic product (GSDP). Major fiscal variables 
are own tax revenue (OTR), own nontax revenue (ONTR), interest payment (IP), Non 
development revenue (NDR), etc. Vote margin has direct impact on all the variables except 
OTR. It is clear that ONTR, IP, pension (PN), custom tax (CT) and NDR improve with vote 
margin. Tax revenue increases with per capita state gdp (pcsgdp), which has indirect impact 
on interest payment, pension, custom tax and non-develop revenue. Average family size has 
direct effect on IP, PN, CT and NDR but indirect effect on OTR. So, associational life 
adversely affects direct tax while it favours IP, PN, CT and NDR. Literacy rate also behaves 
similar to associational life. Tax revenue (both OTR & ONTR) increases with rising crime 
rate. Non development revenue increases with vote margin, literacy rate and average size of 
associational life. Vote margin, literacy rate and average associational life directly affect on 
interest payment, which suggest that educated and associated people want development and 
they are also ready to pay for it in terms of interest payment.  
 
Here Insert Table 3 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
maintenance of city infrastructure such as higher education, traffic, public health, public security or cultural 
facilities require high government revenue for the city. At the same time, the tax bases in cities are sensitive to 
high tax burdens. People react to tax incentives and move from the city center to nearby local communities 
where the tax burden is lower. The asymmetry of spending claims and revenue capacity is often seen as a major 
driving force for problems of fiscal discipline in urban jurisdictions (Frey, 1990; Brueckner, 1983). Socio-
demographical factors such as the share of elderly and the share of pupils expectably push up debt-levels, too. 
These two groups only perceive a small fraction of the initiated costs eventually creating pressure for higher 
government spending. In addition, especially pensioners have an incentive to finance public services by deficit 
spending in order to postpone the costs to future generations (Meltzer and Richard, 1981). The language 
variable is significantly negative indicating that the South Indian non-Hindi speaking people cares more about 
fiscal discipline than North Indian Hindi speaking counterparts. The other control variables have not a robust 
and significant impact on public debt. 
16 If social cohesion in the electorate is strong, it is easier for the government to implement policies according to 
the preferences of the electorate (Matsusaka, 2004). 
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To capture multifaceted features or dimensions, we construct social capital index using 
principal component analysis. The results of the Principal Component Analysis are 
summarized in Table 4. Social capital index has been calculated using the component loading 
weight. Hence, each of the elements loads powerfully onto one underlying component 
extracted from the data. Note that social capital index comprises both structural (i.e., 
associational life including political involvement) and a cultural aspects (i.e., the crime rate). 
So, this social capital index takes account of the dual nature of the concept.  
Here Insert Table 4 
 
Here, this study focuses on major dimension of social capital such as associational life, 
cultural life etc. Major components of social capital are voting turnover, average household 
size, literacy and crime rate. Single social capital index is formulated assigning weights, 
which are taken from principal component analysis (Table 4). Vote turnover rate and literacy 
rate have positive contribution to social capital index and indicate social preference of public 
goods, while average family size and crime rate assign negative value to social capital index. 
Table 4 presents all possible combination of major component of social capital index in India 
during 1991 -2012. Among our major indicators of social capital, vote turnover rate carries 
higher weight compare to other indicators. Negative value is associated with crime rate. It is 
justified because more crime rate indicates less trust prevails in the society – it is also indicate 
the antitrust to social development and also reveals the law and order situation or weak 
government or/and institution. 
Table 5 and Table 6 describe the impact of the major components of social capital on revenue 
generation which is a vital component of fiscal performance. Revenue source of the states are 
mainly own tax and own nontax. Vote turnover rate is highly significant but its impact on 
revenue collection is different and in opposite direction, i.e., own tax revenue falls as vote 
turnover increases while own nontax revenue rises. It indicates that higher social (trust) 
capital reduces own tax (or direct tax) revenue while increases indirect tax. Crime rate has 
positive impact on tax revenue. This suggests that as crime rate increases social general trust 
is reduced thereby social capital declines which may force to increase both tax and nontax 
revenues. Larger size of associational life reduces tax revenues whereas literacy rate has 
positive impact on it. ONTR declines with increasing population density and seat margin. 
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Here Insert Table 5 
 
Components of social capital are replaced by social capital index and repeat the exercise and 
results are presented in Table 6. Combining major social dimensions all types of social 
capital index has indirect effect on tax revenue but direct effect on nontax revenue. Here, 
higher value of social index indicates higher level of social capital that suggests less direct 
tax burden and more indirect tax.  
 
Here Insert Table 6 
 
Here Insert Table 7 
 
Table 7 presents panel data estimated fiscal deficit. We compare results of pooled and 
random effect model in panel data analysis. Social capital determines fiscal deficit directly. 
Seat margin in the general election has strong and direct impact on determining fiscal deficit.  
 
5. Conclusion 
This paper provides evidence for the hypothesis that social capital influences fiscal 
performance. Empirical results in India suggest that social capital indirectly control the fiscal 
performance of the elected government. Fiscal deficit reduces by 2.6% to 2.8 % if one 
percent vote turnover rate rises. The strong political trust is established through vote turnover 
and vote share in the election for formation of government that create the platform for sound 
fiscal policy decisions and hence the lower public deficits. The results are robust to a number 
of control variables and inclusion of additional variables. We use information from direct 
voter participation on political issues and government formation. In order to take both aspects 
of trust into account – trust among members of a society and trust between the incumbent and 
the constituency – we collected data from all general elections held during 1991-2012. These 
results are consistent with those reported by Putnam et al. (1993) from Italian regions, Keefer 
and Knack (1997) or Zak and Knack (2001) from cross-country regressions or Knack (1999) 
from US state governments for government performance.  
The results presented in this paper as well as in previous studies underline the importance of 
social capital as an essential aspect for the well functioning of a government and the 
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institutional architecture in place. However, the understanding of how social capital is built 
and how government can foster trust remains a fruitful field for further research.  
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Table 1: descriptive statistics of major variables for the period of 1991-2012 
Variable  Observations Mean Std.Dev Min Max 
Fiscal deficit 630 43552.06 87077.41 -13837 669437.4 
Log(FiscalDeficit) 630 8.5924 3.2863 -9.535 13.41 
Vote turnover LS 614 61.28 12.12 25.68 91.77 
Vote turnover BS 612 69.81 11.14 23.82 91.82 
Winner Seats 612 81.58 58.1 16 224 
Winner Vote 612 37.6 8.998 18.75 71.09 
Runner Vote 603 27.54 8.99 7.88 49.27 
Voter rejected (%) 612 2.01 2.0 0 9.19 
Seat Margin 612 45.94 43.84 1 190 
Vote margin 612 10.47 11.77 -8.84 70.41 
Economic Crime rate 336 6.91 4.21 0.84 29.58 
Literacy rate 336 72.29 9.43 47 94.21 
Average Family Size 336 5.02 0.56 3.6 6.4 
 
Table 2: Regression results of trust on log value of fiscal deficit 
 
Variables Random-Effect GLS regression Fixed-Effect (within) regression 
Coefficient t-value p-value Coefficient t-value p-value 
Trust -0.0280964**  -2.3 0.022 -0.0260539** 1.97 0.049 
T  0.201015*** 16.77 0.000 0.2011422*** 16.62 0.000 
Constant  8.433497*** 10.58 0.000 8.359413*** 10.62 0.000 
   
R2 (within) 0.3378   0.3378   
R2 (between) 0.0481   0.0458   
R2 (overall) 0.2079   0.2066   
Sigma_u 1.8308   1.8516   
Sigma_e 1.6604   1.6604   
Rho 0.5487   0.5543   
No. of Obs. 586   586   
Note: ‘***’, ‘**’ and ‘*’ denote the level of statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 
Table 3: OLS estimated results of selected few fiscal indicators measured in % of GSDP 
 
Variables  OTR ONTR IP PN CT NDR 
Vote 
margin 
-0.062*** 
(-4.89) 
0.3162*** 
(9.58) 
0.0208*** 
(3.31) 
0.0124** 
(2.12) 
0.525*** 
(5.5) 
0.3607*** 
(9.28) 
Eco Crime 
rate 
0.0738* 
(1.74) 
0.312*** 
(2.82) 
0.0274 
(1.3) 
-0.038* 
(-191) 
-0.21703 
(-0.68) 
0.2107 
(1.62) 
Literacy 
rate 
-0.092*** 
(-3.86) 
-0.039 
(-0.63) 
0.0592*** 
(5.02) 
0.073*** 
(6.64) 
0.6474*** 
(3.61) 
0.3282*** 
(4.5) 
Pop density -0.00009 
(-0.93) 
-0.0007*** 
(-2.8) 
-0.0001*** 
(-2.77) 
-0.0001** 
(-2.21) 
-0.00078 
(-1.08) 
-0.0008*** 
(-2.72) 
Avg Family 
Size 
-1.358*** 
(-4.38) 
.6637 
(0.82) 
0.82735*** 
(5.39) 
0.514*** 
(3.59) 
8.3186*** 
(3.56) 
4.078*** 
(4.29) 
Pcsgdp 0.00005*** 
(5.41) 
0.00003 
(1.23) 
-0.00002*** 
(-4.99) 
-.0003*** 
(-6.06) 
-0.00032*** 
(-4.66) 
-0.00012*** 
(-4.14) 
Constant 17.981*** 
(6.85) 
-2.544 
(-0.37) 
-5.302*** 
(-4.08) 
-4.72*** 
(-3.89) 
-63.105*** 
(-3.2) 
-35.185*** 
(-4.38) 
       
R2 0.2759 0.3700 0.2828  0.3427 0.2813 0.4138 
Adj.R2 0.2508 0.3481 0.2579 0.3198 0.2564 0.3935 
N 180 180 180 179 180 180 
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Note: Numbers in parentheses are t-values. ‘***’, ‘**’ and ‘*’ denote the level of significance  at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 
Table 4: Principal Component Analysis (PCA) and Social Capital Index 
A: SCindex 
Component Measure Component Loading  
Vote turnover 0.5729 
Econ Crime rate -0.1601 
Avg (min)Association size -0.583 
Literacy rate 0.5534 
  
Eigenvalue 1.76948 
Percentage variation  44.24 
Note: SCindex is generated using above weights.  
B: SC 
Component Measure Component Loading  
Vote turnover (LS) 0.6113 
Vote turnover (BS) 0.6032 
Econ Crime rate -0.2701 
A.F. Size [Association size] -0.4352 
  
Eigenvalue 2.1063 
Percentage variation  52.66 
Note: SC is generated using above weights. 
C: SCC 
Component Measure Component Loading  
Vote turnover (LS) 0.6754 
Vote turnover (BS) 0.6219 
Econ Crime rate -0.3040 
  
Eigenvalue 1.8478 
Percentage variation  61.59 
Note: SCC is generated using above weights. 
 
Table 5: Major dimensions of social capital and revenue performance 
 
Variables OTRGSDP ONTRGSDP 
Vote turn over -0.099*** 
(-9.65) 
0.1028*** 
(3.07) 
Eco Crime rate 0.08496** 
(2.35) 
0.171* 
(1.72) 
Literacy rate 0.0433*** 
(3.03) 
-0.066*** 
(-2.9) 
Pop density  -0.00004 
(-0.79) 
-0.0003*** 
(-3.47) 
A. F. Size -1.24*** 
(13.23) 
0.313 
(0.75) 
Seat margin  -0.0005 
(-0.16) 
-0.0123*** 
(-4.89) 
Constant  15.56*** 
(11.26) 
-0.902 
(-0.2) 
   
R2 0.2252 0.0488 
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N 180 180 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are t-values. ‘***’, ‘**’ and ‘*’ denote  
the level of significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 
 
Table 6: Social Capital Index and Revenue performance 
A: Using Scindex  
 OTRGSDP ONTRGSDP 
Scindex  -0.045*** 
(-4.64) 
0.048* 
(1.68) 
Pop density 0.00015*** 
(6.07) 
-0.0003*** 
(-6.4) 
Seat margin -0.00006 
(-0.02) 
-0.015*** 
(-9.21) 
Constant  9.67*** 
(11.6) 
0.306 
(0.16) 
R2 0.056 0.0281 
B: Using SC 
 OTRGSDP ONTRGSDP 
SC -0.04002*** 
(-3.52) 
0.03626* 
(1.74) 
Seat margin 0.00013 
(0.03) 
-0.00035 
(-0.03) 
Literacy rate -0.03098 
(-1.23) 
-0.10656 
(-1.34) 
Lnpcsgdp  1.4182*** 
(3.63) 
3.133** 
(2.53) 
Lnpopdensity  0.6253*** 
(4.44) 
-1.704*** 
(-3.81) 
Constant  -6.846** 
(-2.04) 
-16.64 
(-1.56) 
   
R2 0.3209 0.1362 
Adj R2 0.3007 0.1105 
N 174 174 
C: Using SCC 
 OTRGSDP ONTRGSDP 
SCC -0.0372*** 
(-3.6) 
0.5691* 
(1.74) 
.... .... ... 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are t-values. ‘***’, ‘**’ and ‘*’ denote  
the level of significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 
 
Table 7: Panel data estimated fiscal deficit 
Variables  Pooled  Random effect 
SC  343.67***  
(3.47)  
272.72*  
(1.72)  
Seat margin  156.8***  
(4.76)  
78.373**  
(1.96)  
Literacy rate  159.79  
(0.88)  
-37.62  
(-0.13)  
Pop density  1.246*  
(1.65)  
1.42  
(0.97)  
Pcsgdp  -0.0908  
(-1.12)  
-0.1185  
(-1.07)  
constant  -40438.4***  
(-3.27)  
-16542.4  
(-0.82)  
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R2  0.1045  0.0909  
R2 (between)   0.2311  
R2 (within)   0.004  
N  335  335  
Note: Numbers in parentheses are t-values. ‘***’, ‘**’ and ‘*’ denote  
the level of significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
0
.1
.2
.3
D
en
si
ty
-10 -5 0 5 10 15
lnFisDef            
Fig 1: Distribution of log(FD) 
 
 
 
    
0
.0
1
.0
2
.0
3
.0
4
D
e
n
si
ty
20 40 60 80 100
Trust  
Fig 2: Distribution of Trust variable 
 
 
